Is the very notion of  representation  relevant for the regulation game of video game developers? by Legault, Marie-Josee & Weststar, Johanna
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Management and Organizational Studies 
Publications 
Management and Organizational Studies 
Department 
Fall 10-2010 
Is the very notion of "representation" relevant for the regulation 
game of video game developers? 
Marie-Josee Legault 
Teluq-UQAM 
Johanna Weststar 
weststar@uwo.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/mospub 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the Work, Economy 
and Organizations Commons 
Citation of this paper: 
Legault, Marie-Josee and Weststar, Johanna, "Is the very notion of "representation" relevant for the 
regulation game of video game developers?" (2010). Management and Organizational Studies 
Publications. 12. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/mospub/12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IS THE VERY NOTION OF “REPRESENTATION” RELEVANT FOR THE 
REGULATION GAME OF VIDEO GAME DEVELOPERS? 
 
Marie-Josée Legault, Teluq-uqam; mjlegaul@teluq.uqam.ca 
 
Johanna Weststar, Saint Mary’s University; weststar@smu.ca 
 
 
 
Presented at the Challenges for Work and Workers in the Knowledge Economy 
conference.  Halifax, NS. October 29-31, 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
Videogame developers are the graphic artists, animators, computer 
programmers, game designers and producers who create video games. They are 
emblematic of the rising actors on the contemporary labour scene as they are highly 
skilled, mobile, non-unionized knowledge workers who are members of a project team. 
The industry has maintained the non-conformist feel of the dotcom era and created an 
image of a hip, fun, and free culture where you can get paid to play games (dePeuter & 
Dyer-Witheford, 2005; Ross, 2003). 
The reality is somewhat different. The industry is highly secretive, competitive 
and largely risk-averse.  Top tier console games can cost over $30 million to produce, 
yet due to extreme competition during the prime Christmas selling season, less than 
10% of video games shipped break even (IGDA, 2004: 42).The industry is dominated 
by a few major publishing studios such as Nintendo, Activision Blizzard, Electronic 
Arts, and Ubisoft (Sheffield, 2010) with smaller third party studios (who take contracts 
from publishers) and independent development studios.   
Work is organized under the  project management regime where the iron 
triangle of constraints (budget, schedule and scope), are paramount drivers in the lives 
of project team members (Chasserio & Legault, 2009; Legault & Bellemare, 2008). 
Each game must be completed on time, within budget, and have sufficient attributes to 
be popular among customers, because pre-release marketing and the date of product 
release are decisive factors of success (Deuze, Chase Bowen & Allen, 2007; Kline, 
Dyer-Witheford & dePeuter, 2003).  
As a result, our field studies reveal a host of risks coming from these 
constraints and from the industry itself: sustained long working hours (‘crunch’), 
unlimited and unpaid overtime, poor work-life balance, scarcity of women, high 
incidence of musculoskeletal disorders and burnout, unacknowledged intellectual 
property rights, limited crediting standards, non-compete and non-disclosure 
agreements, and limited or unsupported training opportunities (see Batt, 
Christopherson, Rightor, & van Jaarsveld, 2001; Deuze, 2007; Deuze, Chase Bowen & 
Allen, 2007, Dyer-Witheford & dePeuter, 2006a & b, Legault & Weststar, 2010; Ross, 
2003, 2009). Despite these considerable issues, workers in the videogame industry, 
like most high-tech knowledge workers, remain unorganized by trade unions.  
However, that is not to say that negotiation and resistance are not occurring.  Indeed, as 
Haiven (2006: 87) notes, “deployers [of labour] and their workers are negotiating all of 
the time, even in the absence of trade unions.” 
 In this paper we question whether videogame developers face a representation 
gap due to the lack of unionization or whether their current means of action are 
appropriate and sufficient protections against employment risk.  To answer this 
question we will first sketch the working conditions of videogame developers and then 
describe their individual and collective means of action to face employment 
challenges.  We will then discuss the strengths and failings of these approaches vis a 
vis unionization and propose potential alternatives that would be a better fit than the 
traditional Wagnerian model of union representation.  Three sets of data inform this 
discussion:   
1. 53 interviews of salaried videogame developers working in various studios 
in Montreal conducted in the summer of 2008 with roughly equal numbers 
of men and women. 
2. Data from the 2009 Quality of Life survey created and administered by the 
International Game Developers Association (IGDA) Quality of Life 
Committee.  The total sample size is 3362 and includes game developers in 
all sub-specialties in a variety of employment relationships.    
3. Overview of content of the social web (articles, blogs, comments, open 
forums) that directly or indirectly discussed game developer working 
conditions and that accumulated from 2004-2010.  This is a review of the 
online sites and e-zines where gamers, game developers and game industry 
journalists post articles and blogs regarding the state of the industry and 
interact on open forums (i.e., Gamasutra, IGDA, GameWatch).   
 
Working Conditions in the Videogame Industry 
 
Though often full time, employment in game production is seldom long term 
and permanent. Inasmuch as employees are moving from project to project and studio 
to studio, their portfolio careers are boundaryless (Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Hyde, 
2000). There is high mobility in the trade, itself a direct consequence of high demand 
for workers, shortage of qualified workers and industry churn due to studio start-ups, 
shut-downs, buy-outs and mergers. Employers who want to retain their highly skilled 
and otherwise mobile talent often do so by offering high salaries, stock options, a 
creative basket of perks, and challenging meaningful work (Milton, 2003).  
Jobs in videogame developing require a significant level of skills that are not 
studio-specific, but are rooted in changing software, hardware, and game engines that 
are mastered through experience, not just formal training. Thus, mentorship and 
apprenticeship opportunities and a great deal of self-study are an important part of 
becoming proficient in the field. Technology-driven industry environments are fast-
paced, turbulent, and complex. Studios and workers need to be competent, flexible, 
and fast: 
 
Ultimately, the ability of mid-level workers in information 
technology industries to attain and retain their high status in the 
labor market requires dealing with rapid change. It requires the 
ability to stay on top of industry trends and changing skill 
demands, to find access to multiple employment opportunities 
when needed, and to build career mobility over time across 
multiple organizational contexts. Workers in these occupations 
solve these problems of maintaining the market relevance of 
their skills by taking advantage of networks of information 
exchange in communities of workers who share similar types of 
expertise. Groups of users become resources for each other in 
maintaining knowledge about skills that are in demand (Benner, 
2003:199-200). 
 
Work assignments are performance focused. As with IT specialists, high-tech 
and new media workers, videogame developers are told how wonderful, lucrative, 
autonomous and creative a job they have, but this autonomy comes out as a constant 
test or trial that can end up in firing if they fail to exert it in making the project a 
success. In reputation systems, bold successes come with violent crashes. The 
considerable room for autonomy and decision-making allowed actors makes them 
responsible for reaching goals that haven’t been imposed on them, but that are 
perceived as a common contract among free actors, or a commitment the actor is 
bound to honour. As a result, individuals bear more responsibility towards risk 
(Legault & Bellemare, 2008; Neff, Wissinger & Zukin, 2005).  
Long working hours and unlimited and unpaid overtime are a paramount problem in 
the trade (IGDA, 2004). In Québec, where our interviews took place, the Act 
respecting labour standards (RSQ, ch. N-1.1, sec. 52-55) clearly states that an 
employer who explicitly asks an employee to work overtime must pay for the overtime 
hours at premium rate; conversely, if the employer does not want to pay for the 
overtime, he cannot require an employee to work it. Still, studios’ practices are legally 
ambiguous because managers and supervisors do not actually ask designers to work 
overtime.  They claim that overtime is never compulsory, but that developers do it on 
their own initiative. Some of our interview respondents did refuse to work overtime; 
however, they usually end up having to limit their career ambitions as a result. While 
some developers are compensated for these ‘willingly worked’ overtime hours based 
on a bonus system and compensatory free time, compensation is never guaranteed. 
Moreover, when they are compensated, it is only in part, and its level is uncertain and 
discretionary.  According to data from the 2009 Quality of Life survey, almost half of 
the sample (N=1943) receive no compensation for crunch.  Nine percent receive 
overtime pay, 20% get time off, 15% receive perks during crunch and 13% receive a 
bonus. The way overtime is managed is a source of significant dissatisfaction.  
The resulting portrait immediately raises the question: how do companies get 
these unhappy developers to work so many hours of unpaid overtime? We put forward 
an explanation that is based on the existence of an informal, albeit highly effective 
system of rewards and punishments that relies on the importance of reputation. 
Developers need a strong portfolio and good name to increase or maintain their 
mobility and work on high-profile games in an industry resolutely focused on creation, 
innovation and drive (Legault & Ouellet, 2011). Neither purely voluntary and freely 
agreed to, nor required and forced, overtime comes under the broad category of 
“voluntary but expected” working hours (Campbell, 2002:141). This is at the heart of 
the quality of life movement and data pointing to high turnover, burn-out and work-life 
conflict (IGDA, 2004).   
A second problem in the industry is the reach of non-compete agreements.  
Agreements not to compete during the period of employment are common in skilled 
jobs and considered reasonable. On the contrary, non-compete agreements which 
extend beyond the employment period lower developer quality of life by reducing 
future employment opportunities. In practice, case law does not provide a high 
probability of enforcing such agreements with rank and file developers, but more often 
with managers. Though in practice studios do not often take proceedings against 
developers, still, the idea of being sued is a powerful threat. In the worst cases, 
employees are unable to change jobs without relocating from the area, or are even 
forced to leave the industry entirely.  
The industry is non-union and it is no secret that studios are eager to avoid 
unionization. It is common knowledge among developers that it is dangerous to make 
jokes like distributing union cards to sign. One of our respondents learned this quite 
quickly from colleagues when he proposed this prank for April Fool’s Day. Usually 
quite strict about attribution on their forums, Gamastura seems to allow anonymous 
comments when the issue is working conditions or unionization.  When asked about 
management’s response to a theoretical unionization attempt at their studio, half of the 
respondents to the 2009 IGDA QoL survey said management would oppose the drive; 
15% said the drive would be opposed with threats and harassment. 
In summary, in spite of better wages and conditions than many workers, 
developers need tools to promote mobility, protection against firing or being contracted 
out, relief from unlimited and unpaid overtime, legal help with employment-related 
contract negotiation and claims, training opportunities, and a means of protectionist 
demarcation from other groups of skilled workers (Haiven, 2006; Ross, 2003).  As we 
will discuss below, videogame developers currently cope with these employment 
issues through a variety of recourses towards representing their interests and 
sometimes make inroads into regulating power.  
 
Individual Recourses 
 
Threat or Real Exit - Mobility 
 
The threat of leaving the studio is the bargaining device most readily at hand. 
Studio managers often head hunt good developers and are willing to pay a high price to 
hire them away from competitors. Often specialized head-hunting firms and brokers 
negotiate for developers.  Particularly for those operating in regional hot spots for 
game development, it is relatively easy to leave a job for another and these decisions 
are often made light-heartedly. This doesn’t jeopardize in any way the chance to return 
to the same studio in the future.  
Dropping an Easter Egg 
 
During the eighties, developers began to claim property rights in the original 
content they were creating. As acknowledgement of these rights was unregulated, each 
developer had to bargain from scratch, and the result depended on individual skills and 
context. Rather than leaving when dissatisfied, they began to drop a so-called Easter 
Egg at a strategic point in the actual gameplay. This was often an object bearing their 
name, a coded signature to underline their contribution. These devices were popular 
among game players and upgraded game design because the coding strategies used to 
insert such objects were later incorporated into mainstream production techniques.  
 Leaking 
 
Dissatisfied developers can also practice risky underground activities such as 
leaking confidential information about a game-in-the-making, an important feature, or a 
technological breakthrough. This is of course radically forbidden and developers are tied 
by precise non-disclosure agreements. If discovered, they can be sued and severely 
punished.  Moreover, they damage their own local and international reputations. Despite 
this, leaking remains a latent threat feared by managers.  
Individual Employee Voice 
 
According to some of our interviewees, there are official policies that managers 
must allow 30% of their time to answer employee’s queries and discuss their problems. 
Interviewees indicate that many senior and HR managers are open to such one-to-one 
discussions.  Some women in particular report gratitude for specific arrangements they 
received regarding work-family balance.  
Legal Action  
 
In the case of an arbitrary sanction, developers also have the option of 
complaining under the Labour Standards or hiring a lawyer. Given the huge 
dissymmetry between management and developers in terms of the resources to launch 
legal action, this is not a common option. Even if the dissatisfaction is great, 
consequences of filling a complaint seem greater (Legault & Ouellet, 2011).  
Collective Recourse 
 
Professional Associations 
 
The International Game Developers Association (IGDA) is a professional 
association first aimed at updating and sharing knowledge, resources, skills and 
portfolio, maintaining employability, networking, and job placement. IGDA 
membership fees are often reimbursed by the studios which shows how cooperative the 
association can appear to employers.   
That said, in recent years the role of the IGDA has expanded toward collective 
action. They offer a health and benefits plan for developers who do not have coverage 
from their employer.  As well, a series of volunteer committees target the main 
problem areas of the industry.  For example, a grievance committee acts as a watchdog 
for compliance with the policies and recommendations put forward by other 
committees. Members of the IGDA can submit grievances on issues that contravene 
IGDA standards. The committee appoints an investigator who confirms or denies the 
grievance. If the grievance is confirmed, the IGDA informs the studio that they will be 
written up in the next Quarterly Report on Confirmed Grievances, should the practice 
continue. Examples of committees that set standards are: crediting and intellectual 
property committee, anti-exclusive clauses committee, and quality of life committee.  
The crediting and intellectual property committee proposes voluntary game 
industry crediting practices that properly recognize those responsible for the creation 
of games.  The  anti-exclusive clauses committee advocates best practices and tries to 
limit non-compete agreements by rewarding employers who offer less onerous 
provisions in this area. The IGDA is betting on the fact that studios dislike bad 
publicity in the context of highly competitive head hunting.  
The quality of life committee has conducted two surveys of their membership 
(2004 and 2009) to canvass the state of ‘Quality of Life’ (QoL) in the industry.  These 
surveys are particularly concerned with burnout, turnover, crunch time and the length of 
working hours, vacation and sick time.  The report following the 2004 survey is now a 
benchmark for the industry and received considerable attention (IGDA, 2004).  It indicated 
that the industry may be at a point of crisis due to high burn-out rates and retention issues.  
They conclude that the industry cannot grow or mature if it consistently loses its 
experienced talent at mid-life. A taskforce is currently working on a QoL Certification in 
employment contracts. Based on a comprehensive set of core elements that reflect best 
employment practices, they provide employment contract provisions that can be used by 
studios as the gold standard. Compliant studios will be publically IGDA QoL certified, on 
the model of the ISO standards. 
General Meetings  
 
In larger studios, there is an annual general meeting. Some employees jump at 
the opportunity to ask the “killer question”. They use this sort of action for potentially 
“political” collective issues rather than personal ones.  
Going Public in the Social Web 
 
The threat of seeing developers using the social web to publicize their claims 
and grievances always lies in the background. It adds a powerful layer of bargaining 
power to developers who, though loosely organised, share that claim. In 1999 an 
anonymous group ironically described working conditions at Ubisoft on a website 
called Ubifree. They claimed to be the virtual union of Ubisoft employees and sent an 
invitation to join to all employees around the world. The small initiative harvested a 
wealth of supportive messages, many of them denouncing the working conditions. 
After only a few months management of Ubisoft announced many improvements and 
the anonymous group closed down the website-union. One improvement was the 
addition of an employee representative in a few committees; however, this 
representative was never granted any decision-making power.   
A more successful episode was the “EA Spouse” affair.  In November 2004 the 
fiancé of a developer (later revealed to be Erin Hoffman) used her LiveJournal blog to 
denounce an abusive situation of constant crunch time in Los Angeles’ Electronic Arts 
(EA) studio. Similar to the Ubifree movement her post received thousands of 
comments from gaming fans and beleaguered developers at EA and other studios. 
They rallied a huge movement against EA in particular and crunch time in general, and 
triggered three class-action suits (EA, Vivendi and Sony) that alleged studios denied 
employees overtime pay (Schumacher, 2006). EA later banned work on Sundays and 
adopted a policy favouring five working days a week. In addition, EA reclassified 
nearly 200 positions as eligible for overtime pay; however, they were no longer given 
stock options. The event was also the catalyst for the IGDA QoL movement and 
Hoffman now sits as a IGDA board member. 
Self-Regulation 
 
Inspired by fans’ support, Hoffman launched GameWatch in April 2006, a 
watchdog website dedicated to policing employment practices in studios by using 
whistle-blowing. Electronic Arts’ spokeswoman Tammy Schachter would not 
comment directly on GameWatch or the original EA Spouse post, but she admitted that 
the studio keeps an ear tuned to blog chatter.“’We take it seriously any time someone 
is talking about the company,’” Schachter said. “’Electronic Arts is sensitive to blogs, 
and a lot of the changes we have implemented have been in response to that type of 
feedback.’” (Boscia, 2007)  
Discussion 
 
Effectiveness of Current Means of Individual and Collective Recourse 
 
As knowledge workers, videogame developers can’t easily be ignored because 
there is a shortage of manpower and a high demand for labour, they own rare, complex 
and hermetic knowledge (though to differing degrees), they have direct access to 
strategic information, and a ready platform to ‘go public’. Arguably, this places them in 
a position to use means that are not as available to industrial or rank-and-file workers 
(i.e., leaking industrial secrets or having a more persuasive voice).  As Haiven (2006: 87) 
notes: 
Even where the deployer has great coercive power, work order 
is not guaranteed regardless of how much power the deployer 
can wield because workers can refuse to cooperate. Imagine, 
then, how much greater the consent required in situations where 
the workers have some degree of skill and collective cohesion 
and where they can damage expensive machinery, or where they 
interact crucially with the public, or where the product or service 
they produce must be delivered ‘just-in-time.’ 
 
However, with respect to real and lasting representation and protection in an 
employment relationship, there are flaws to each of the abovementioned means of 
individual and collective recourse.   
With respect to leaking and dropping Easter eggs, the former is too rare and too 
disassociated from specific grievances to be of influence and the later is concerned 
with only one specific area of grievance.  However, dropping Easter eggs is a very 
good way to make a name in the tightly-knit community of gamers and developers 
which then leads to more individual power. Moreover, it has been quite efficient in 
negotiating new means of crediting developers for their original contributions (Kline, 
Dyer-Witheford & dePeuter, 2003). 
Real or threatened exit. 
 
Though mobility might seem attractive and desired under the individualized 
rhetoric so pervasive in the modern risk society (Beck, 1992) and among high-tech 
workers in particular, this flexibility is not universally beneficial (Allen & Henry, 
1997).  For the those remaining at the organization, there is no lasting benefit accrued 
from the exit of dissatisfied developers unless turnover is substantial and the reasons 
for leaving can be clearly discerned or addressed by management.  It is, in Hirshman’s 
(1970) terms, an exit solution instead of a voice solution. It allows workers a certain 
leverage to find a way out of a conflict without having to surrender and become a 
victim. However, this only works as long as the demand for developers is high; any 
change in this context can cause perceived mobility power to collapse.  Therefore risks 
of outsourcing, the recent economic downturn and the rise in degree programs in game 
development are of concern.  Mobility power in the threat of leaving is also highly 
dependent on the demand for the developer at stake with the most sought-after having 
more leverage than the easy-to-replace. 
Employee voice. 
 
In the broad industrial relations literature, it is accepted that contemporary 
managers tend to set forth formalised mechanisms of voice with the aim of non-union 
employee representation and union avoidance (Taras & Kaufman, 2006: 519).  These 
systems fail to promote the organizational democracy that would ensure employees have 
some say in their working lives and allow for the advancement of worker interests 
(Butler, 2005; Findlay, 1992; Lloyd, 2001; Watling & Snook, 2001). But there are other 
managerial objectives to non-union employee representation: securing consent to 
managerial plans, promoting employee involvement and empowerment, mobilizing the 
workforce into extra contractual performance, fostering cooperation and knowledge-
sharing, enhancing production efficiency, and providing a forum for workers to construct 
mutual-gain outcomes (Taras & Kaufman, 2006). However, Butler (2009) concluded 
that managers fail to attain these goals, and his explanation sheds light on the failure of 
the organizational democratic process as well. His study showed built-in ‘rival logics of 
action’ that prompt objectives that are both defensive (union avoidance) and proactive in 
nature (eliciting commitment) which threatens the end result: 
There is an evident tension in management’s quest for goals 
relating to the stout defence of [management] prerogative on the 
one hand, and the generation of employee engagement and 
commitment through the structured involvement of the 
workforce, on the other. [...] the interplay between external 
factors (a regulatory shock necessitating enhanced employee 
buy in and commitment) and internal micro influences (a unitary 
culture and a belief in the sanctity of prerogative) were giving 
rise to a ‘contradictory canvas’ with respect to voice outcomes. 
(Butler, 2009: 211) 
 
Similarly, Upchurch et al. (2006) conclude there is ‘a paradox of intention’. 
Their thesis is that while management claims non-union employee representation gives 
rise to employee involvement and influence, the reality is that of a consolidation of 
existing power discrepancies. In the same way, our respondents’ account of general 
meetings and “open door” policies shows contradiction between the goal of union 
avoidance and real employee involvement required to reach a convergence of interests. 
The conditions of the latter are compromised by the former goal, that is limiting 
objects of consultation and employees consulted as well (Bulter, 2009; Heery, 2009). 
That said, employee voice mechanisms seem under-developed in the videogame 
industry and show less overt managerial motivation to avoid unions as would 
employer-sponsored representation in decision-making bodies or statutory work 
councils, for instance. 
Indeed, open door policies and other mechanisms of employee voice are not a 
universal norm in the industry and, like other workplaces, success often depends on the 
manager or team lead involved.  In an article that was widely and favourably received 
on the web, video game producer Mike Acton (2010) shared his tips on how to be a 
good manager.  He advocates for “one-on-ones” as the most important part of his job.  
He goes on to say that the formal one-on-ones are not enough and he suggests that it is 
part of the producer’s job to constantly be seeking feedback.  The content and  
reception of Acton’s post denote it as a call to do better and indicate that there are 
barriers to the act of talking to one’s manager about employment issues. 
For one, the experience and ability of the manager impacts the exercise of 
employee voice.  Due to high turnover in the industry many producers and team leads 
lack experience in managerial roles.  As with other technical fields, most are promoted 
to these roles because of technical proficiency or past participation on a successful 
project rather than managerial aptitude per se.  Another barrier is that the content of the 
claim, as much as the way to voice it, has to be suitable and appropriate, “reasonable” 
or “constructive”. In these high commitment environments, there’s a shared 
understanding that people who “grumble and moan” about working conditions without 
making their voice appropriately heard are part of a denounced “culture” of 
uselessness, withdrawal or cynicism. Game developers carry a shared identity as 
gamers themselves that results in a passion for the work.  The industry further 
inculcates this passion and reinforces themes such as drive, perfectionism, fun, 
spontaneity, and the bonding achieved through extreme circumstances like meeting a 
tight deadline (Weststar, 2010).  This culture then undermines anything considered 
whining, slacking or defection and may support managerial perspectives.  Even weak 
alignment of the perspectives of game developers with management further 
complicates Butler’s contradictory canvas of voice outcomes and dilutes the voice 
function. 
As with the exit function, a final barrier to successful exercise of voice is the 
bargaining power of the individual developer.  This increases with reputation and 
experience. Senior employees are proud to hold the knowledge of who to talk to and 
they can help younger employees find their way into the organizational and social 
labyrinth. But this then remains a somewhat arbitrary means to access power still held 
by management and maintains the privilege of certain groups. Some of our 
interviewees did say that changes don’t come easily and swiftly, but they do come if 
the issue is supported by a mass of employees or is particularly sensitive. 
In all, many employees seem satisfied with the gains obtained.  A reasonable 
number of claims would be addressed at least in part to successfully act as a union 
avoidance strategy.  Though discretionary, the process is accepted because developers 
feel their managers and team leads appeal to their intelligence instead of their 
obedience or docility. According to those of our interview respondents who had voiced 
grievances, the workplace is an ongoing discussion.   
Public voice – The social web. 
 
Social media is now the hot tool for advocacy and change and campaigns for 
various causes are commonplace on Facebook, Twitter, and blogs.  Some of these 
campaigns are highly successful as was the blog campaign launched in support of the 
2007-2008 Writers’ Guild of America strike (O’Brien, 2010).  Some involve the 
sharing of stories and job related information such as the lawyers who use Findlaw’s 
Greedy Associates boards (Taras, 2001) or involve online lobbying as in the  
unsuccessful bid to defeat bill IR35 (which concerns contractor versus wage earner tax 
status in the United Kingdom). With their skills, resources, communication channels 
and connectivity, high-tech workers are able to form issue-based networks and be very 
effective (Milton, 2003:45).  On the face, the EA spouse affair is just such a case: 
One essay written months ago set off a powder keg of response, 
not just from the game industry but from the entire software 
development community. Truly, the power of the Internet is 
astounding, and all other things aside, we live in a positive age 
when so much information can be shared so easily and quickly. 
The thing that lifted this up into public view, though, was not 
my essay so much as the response to it. (Hoffman, 2004)  
 
Capacity to instantly and internationally share strategic information and to 
coordinate collective action by the same means allows for quickly constituting a 
redoubtable stock of evidence in cases of media or legal action1. Social networks 
remove two important obstacles to collective action: limits to circulation of 
information and the constraint of physical gathering to deploy collective expression 
(Shirky, 2008:143-160). Closer to a democracy of the multitude model and emblematic 
of the alter-globalization movement, many developers reject any transcendental 
hierarchy of command in collective action. They prefer to collectively produce social 
organization in temporary coalitions under an immanent model where the various 
social actors collaborate instead of being imposed an order by an external authority 
(Hardt & Negri, 2004:336-40; Milton, 2003). This ethos is strengthened among 
developers.  They have been socialized in gamer communities where players 
collaborate in massively multi-player online games (MMOs) and ‘mod’ the source 
code of games to create new variations of gameplay that are then shared.  They are also 
influenced by the collaborative open source movement in general where the source 
code is open for anyone to see and improve or modify.  
In this way EA spouse mobilization empowered developers and provided them 
with the feeling that `another kind of job action’ is possible -- one that is emerging, 
spontaneous, non-permanent, non-hierarchical, controlled by actors themselves.  This 
is quite contrary to their views of traditional collective action vis a vis unions. 
However, though the response to EA Spouse promoted successful law suits for 
a handful of developers, some positive change to EA’s overtime policies, and raised 
                                            
1 We can estimate the destructive potential of such technological means for an organisation, even a robust one, 
with the story of the spectacular success of sexual abuse victims who used the social web to denounce priests 
in Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests (SNAP) or Voice of the Faithful (VOTF) in the US (See Shirky, 
2008:143-160).  
consciousness in the industry overall, real change has been slow to come.  An article 
titled “Quality of Life? Does Anyone Still Give a Damn?” appeared on the popular 
industry site Gamasutra (Hyman, 2008) and a recent outcry against crunch and unpaid 
overtime at Rockstar San Diego by the “Wives of Rockstar” (Rockstar Spouse, 2010)  
received comparatively less attention than EA Spouse.  A comment by a Rockstar 
employee posted 20 days after the Wives’ original post is illustrative of the fragility of 
the movement: 
 ...R* management have informed its San Diego employees that 
everyone will be given a generous and extended break after the 
product conclusion. Maybe I feel a bit guilty about venting in a 
public place about any negative aspect of a job I still adore, 
especially now that I've read a few press snippets that have taken 
quotes of my writings slightly out of context. I don't think 
anything I ever said was "damning". Since no one else has, I'll 
say that I feel our concerns have been responded to one way or 
another, and it has been favorable. I think it should also be said 
that the long mandatory working hours for this project, at least 
for my own tenure, are unprecedented at San Diego in 
particular. They've told us that it certainly wasn't their intention 
to extend working hours in such a manner, and I believe them. I 
think we'll all pull through just fine, we'll get our time off, and I 
don't see this situation happening again anytime soon. 
My apologies go to Rockstar for not anticipating that anything I 
said here could possibly have a negative impact of some kind. 
(Code Monkey, 2010) 
 
In this case management apologized, gave a one-time reward, and deflected 
blame.  It is unknown whether lasting changes were made to the problems in 
development process and decision-making hierarchy that were credited with creating 
the ‘death march’ by these developers.  The Ubifree movement was also quickly 
silenced with only cursory appeasements from management.  As for lasting change in 
the industry, one year after Rockstar San Diego complaints of crunch time at THQ 
Kaos Studios received limited response outside of a disapproving letter posted by the 
IGDA (IGDA, 2011).  Developers themselves comment on the fleeting nature of these 
web-based movements and there is growing popular critique of the ability of social 
media to promote real engagement and lasting change.  Developers easily post a 
supportive comment on a blog, but seem reluctant to engage more fully to push for real 
changes to the working conditions in their industry.   
Similar to the threat of exit or more traditional employee voice mechanisms, 
social media strategies rely on the existence of a so-called “supplier market”.  So, 
employers are likely to respond to the publicized concerns to preserve their recruitment 
and retention in a tight labour market.  As well, many game studios are heavily state-
funded and can do without bad publicity.  Regardless, the response may be limited as 
noted above, or it may have a perverse effect. Following the class actions wave in 
California, EA transferred hundreds of developers to Florida and Canada, wishing to 
avoid its new liability to pay them overtime (Feldman & Thorsen, 2004). Such a retort 
can chill a movement and stall would-be union organizers in a context where the threat 
of outsourcing always lies in the background.  Developers show fear as well and many 
maintain anonymity in online posts that are critical of their employer or the industry in 
general. 
Professional associations. 
 
High-tech labour markets such as new media and videogame development have 
high mobility and limited employer investment in training (Amman, 2002), therefore, 
professional associations play an important role in improving their members’ 
opportunities for finding employment in the regional labour market, helping them to 
improve their skills, and improving their individual negotiating positions (Benner, 
2003:190-2). In high-tech sectors, professional associations or guilds are seeing a 
resurgence (i.e., System Administrators’ Guild, HTML Writers’ Guild, Silicon Valley 
Web Guild) (Benner, 2003).  Though this information diffusion and skills upgrading, 
Benner (2003) argues that guilds increase the economic vibrancy of regional labour 
markets; improved markets can then be leveraged back to improve conditions for the 
members of the guild. Also modern guilds have the capacity to account for two 
important features of the trade: the artistic acumen and the knowledge sharing mindset 
typical of the net generation.  The term ‘guild’ resonates with workers who think of 
their work as a craft and who prioritize the notion of information sharing to increase 
the success of all (Benner, 2003: 186). 
However, these American contemporary guilds cannot reach the same leverage 
unions do. Most importantly they lack the ability to exercise monopoly control over 
access to skilled labour, or to enforce restrictions on production standards. These 
monopoly powers are nearly impossible to achieve in the contemporary economy, 
given the rapidly changing skill requirements associated with the technological change 
and volatility of the information economy (Benner, 2003:182). High-tech workers 
derive considerable status from being associated with cutting-edge technological and 
economic change, but at the same time, and unlike state certified professions, they are 
constantly being market-tested for the relevance of their skills and the organizational 
problems they claim to be able to solve. As the best ways to update your skills revolve 
around networking and knowledge sharing, the communities of practice, guilds and 
associations that have emerged in these occupations tend to be more decentralized and 
democratic, placing less emphasis on the certification of their members and more 
emphasis on actively intervening in the labour market. These associations rarely focus 
on forms of occupational closure (Witz, 1990) and instead provide various services to 
their members, help their membership anticipate and capitalize on changing industry 
trends, build closer ties with employers, and provide placement services. 
As such, an organization like the IGDA has little real power to improve the 
labour process of videogame developers.  They can engage in research and advocacy, 
their voice of displeasure carries more weight in the bad publicity that rogue studios 
receive, and their grievance committee could place them in a role of a third party 
mediator of conflict if both sides agree to this. But, without legal backing, their true 
representational power is limited. 
 Are Unions a Viable Alternative? 
 
Given the flaws in each of the individual and collective recourse currently used 
by videogame developers, one must ask whether unionization is a viable solution to 
their employment challenges.  Throughout Canada and most of the US there is no 
representation gap (Heery, 2009) in that workers who desire unionization would have 
legal access to it.  However the industry has a high anti-union animus.  The IGDA  
2009 Quality of Life survey data provides a rare account of developer perspectives 
(Table 1) which seem to be quasi-equal for and against and a striking number of no 
response.  
 
Table 1: Responses to Questions on Unionization, 2009 QoL Survey 
 
Question N Response Option % 
Some developers believe the 2362 For 34.0 
only way to improve the quality 
of life in the industry is to 
unionize. If a vote were held 
today, how would you vote? 
 Against 
No opinion/prefer not to say 
 
31.5 
35.5 
 
How do you think people in 
your company would vote? 
 
1607 More than ½ For 
More than ½ Against 
50/50 
No opinion/prefer not to say 
 
19.8 
26.2 
16.4 
37.5 
 
If a group of employees tried to 
start a union at your company, 
how would you react? 
1607 Welcome the union 
Oppose the union with information 
Don’t care/prefer not to say 
 
34.2 
24.3 
41.6 
 
Do you feel the labour laws 
offer sufficient protection 
should a grievance arise 
between an employer and an 
employee? 
2362 Yes 
No 
Don’t Know 
 
37.0 
21.8 
41.2 
 
 
The general literature on union propensity among high-tech workers as well as our 
interviews with developers and discussions on the social web point to several key obstacles 
to unionization in its traditional form. 
Mobility and enterprise-based certification. 
 
High mobility among videogame developers is a powerful deterrent to 
unionisation as long as the North American certification and bargaining model is 
enterprise-based. In such a system, all the negotiated advantages held in a collective 
agreement are linked to the ongoing employment relationship. High-tech workers who 
are in demand are very committed to their work and professional groups but see their 
employers as fungible; though issues at stake are important to them, they do not find 
any interest in local battles they would have to support before leaving for another 
project. Low continuance commitment and attractive employment alternatives 
predispose them to change studios rather than lobby for change, while jobs are 
abundant (Milton, 2003). Moreover, analysing union instrumental value among high-
tech workers, Milton stresses that they may accept sub-optimal working conditions if 
they are reasonably compensated and perceive a high payoff in terms of skills and 
reputation in the long run. 
This is mostly what we found among videogame developers facing unlimited 
unpaid overtime. Trapped in an informal reward and punishment system linked to 
building a desired reputation, they are promised future benefits and rewards if they 
consent to it, and conversely promised professional stalling if not. Given the limited 
scope of the information they have, after a cost-benefit analysis, a majority of them 
consent (Legault & Ouellet, 2011).  Such is evidenced by the above quote by Rockstar 
employee ‘CodeMonkey’.  According to him, the employer offered a long period of 
time-off following the massive crunch and promised to avoid such situations in the 
future.  This appeased many of the developers who were now just proud to have 
completed and shipped what they considered was a great game.  Several comments in 
the online thread about crunch at Rockstar consoled the beleaguered team, saying that 
the boost to their reputations from delivering an amazing game under extreme 
conditions would be worth it in the end.  One called it a ‘golden ticket’ on their future 
resumes.   
 Meritocracy. 
 
High tech workers focus on three issues when expressing concerns about how 
"typical" union initiatives compromise workers and organizational performance: 
seniority, remuneration and hours of work, and equality (Milton, 2003: 43). Milton’s 
interviewees argued that seniority-based systems and the rigid job descriptions 
associated with them lead to poor results in learning-oriented meritocracies that rely on 
the most competent people doing the most advanced work. Institutionalizing these 
systems is also seen as incompatible with self perceptions as high achievers who 
advance based on accomplishment, continually learn and enjoy challenging 
assignments.  
Predetermined salary scales are as undesirable. High-tech placement is 
allegedly based on discerning those going above and beyond the norm in pursuit of 
excellence. Expecting to be compensated according to their input, high tech workers 
see unionized pay schemes as divorced from individual performance (Milton, 2003).  
There is some evidence that multi-layered compensation systems are becoming more 
widespread among North American unionized knowledge workers, be they artists, 
high-tech workers or others, who wish to see merit acknowledged (Legault & 
D’Amours, 201*). This is naturally a bold step for a labour union, but whole areas of 
our economy no longer play by the rules set forth in the Wagner Act and new union 
responses must emerge.  
Threat of outsourcing.  
 
What is more complex is that videogame developers have claims pertaining to 
working conditions at the international level, as the industry is world-wide.  Many 
respondents and actors in the field keep a watchful eye on the emergent countries as 
the coming source of a competing workforce that could rapidly overpower the present 
developers’ bargaining power. The constant - though latent - threat of outsourcing is a 
relatively efficient union avoidance strategy. Evidence of this notion abounds in online 
discussions among developers and industry analysts.  What is not articulated among 
developers is that protection against outsourcing could be a reason to organize or that 
unionization of the industry internationally could help to raise standards overall.  An 
example is the movie industry (Mosco, 2006) where Indian union leaders are looking 
for joint initiatives with American unions to prevent social dumping in working 
conditions. 
  Strong professional identity. 
 
According to Milton (2003), viewing unionization simply as a response to 
dissatisfaction and adversity masks the effect of identity on the propensity of workers 
to unionize (see also Deuze, 2007).  This is also largely neglected by labour 
researchers who concentrate on equity and the conflict of interest between labour and 
management. According to image theory, upon deciding whether to unionize, 
developers will try to determine whether being and acting as a union member is 
compatible with their self-image as high tech workers (Milton, 2003), and in line with 
the norms and values embedded in the games community (Weststar, 2010).  Early in 
the unionization process, they will compare their self-definition to their image of 
unions, union members and activity, and measure how unionizing and behaving as a 
union member will affect the way in which valued others perceive them (Milton, 
2003:34).  Following a symbolic interactionist perspective, they consider whether, as 
union members, they would be able to maintain their reputation as credible high-tech 
professionals, and via this reputation access to coveted work and social environments 
(Milton, 2003:36).  
Many of the Montreal developers we interviewed and much of the online 
narrative see unions as anti-creative and antithetical to the meritocracy system that 
anchors excellence in technology-based industries. In their view, high achievers do not 
want to be averaged down to the common level that unionizing involves. They 
perceive unions as fighting causes irrelevant or not central to technology-based 
industries and that may even prove detrimental to the skilled, technical professionals 
therein. 
Viable Alternatives in New Union Forms 
 
All of this is an important, deeply-rooted critique of the contemporary union 
movement and its rules. Not only do new media workers question the use unions make 
of information technology and the social web (Lucio, Walker & Trevorrow, 2009) in 
their daily routine, but the deeper model of collective action they carry. However, an 
industry-wide, multi-employer certification and negotiation process can address many 
of the above obstacles to unionization.  The Act respecting the professional status and 
conditions of engagement of performing, recording and film artists (RSQ c. S-32.1) in 
Québec is an example.  This system for the performing trades allows for social 
insurance plans that follow you throughout your multiple employers and is an early 
adopter of the portable rights principle (Legault & D’Amours, 201*; Remo, 2008) as in 
the US film industry (Amman, 2002).  
Under this system artists can also benefit from the State’s health and security 
plan, and co-regulate the sharing out of incomes drawn royalties and residuals 
(Lefebvre & Merrigan, 2007). Intellectual property rights are very important to 
developers too and they are in need of an overarching protection system not limited to 
the employment contract duration (Legault & D’Amours, 201*).  Moreover, the Act 
respecting the professional status can capture the appreciation for merit. This system 
promotes a minimum standard hiring contract, but allows for better conditions should 
the artist be more in demand or more prestigious. Similarly, individual negotiations or 
“above-scale deals” are a long-time industry practice in the motion picture and 
television unions (Amman, 2002; Batt, Christopherson, Rightor & van Jaarsveld, 
2001).   
 
Conclusion 
 
Through a variety of individual and collective means of action, videogame 
developers play a role in regulating their work conditions; they’re not deprived of 
power, individually or collectively, due to the high demand for their specialized skills 
and strategic use of social networks.  However, the scope of their action is currently 
limited by the structural realities of the videogame industry, by the project 
management regimes that specifically control the labour process and by the ideological 
norms associated with the injunction of autonomy (Chasserio & Legault, 2009; Legault 
& Bellemare, 2008). Whereas the subjected worker is issued a set of specific rules and 
directives to accomplish a task, the responsible, creative and autonomous knowledge 
worker is ordered to produce outcomes rather than procedures.  They are trusted to find 
their way, take the right initiative, put forth the required effort, stick to the right 
practices, and so forth until the job is done.  
This seemingly free and organic process, however, collides with project 
management’s iron triangle and pre-determines a limited set of options. Since the main 
sources of uncertainty and risk are failure to ship a game in time and on budget, and 
labour being the utmost cost, developers have to work unlimited unpaid overtime.  The 
passion for the game and the immense desire to see it shipped and loved by fans is co-
opted by management such that the ‘necessity of overtime’ is internalized by the team.  
Through the injunction of autonomy and the downloading of risk to the team, 
developers do what they have to do to see a game completed at their high standards.  
Moreover, although the highly skilled employees are employed and receive 
fairly good pay, the products they produce may have far greater value than their 
upfront compensation. They do not capture the proceeds from the intellectual goods 
they produce. As employees, they are often bound into competition with their 
employer for proceeds from those rights (Haiven, 2006) and this competition is not 
brought to balance by their current professional association or individual developer 
actions (i.e., Easter eggs).  
So, in materialist terms, developers are not void of motives for collective action 
and their current individual and collective means seem unable to fix systemic problems 
in the industry.  However, under likewise materialist criteria, there are a host of 
deterrents keeping them from unionization. The very structure of the industry is one. A 
project based, regionally and internationally mobile workforce is meant for a blend of 
sector-related and international forms of unionism still to be born. Social aspects of the 
trade, no less important, are serious issues to address; developers are organized into a 
star-system with a somewhat hermetic professional culture and they are not fit for 
unions’ traditional approaches. They face human resource and managerial policies that 
chill unionization attempts because they can be used to resolve some workplace 
problems and therefore reinforce developers’ belief in the ability of individual assets to 
influence decisions.  More, and lastly, developers have alternatives forms of 
collectivism such as the issue-based coalitions noted by Milton (2003) that disband 
when no longer needed (i.e., EA spouse-like mobilization).  Though these are much 
frailer than collective bargaining, they fit the paramount ideological current and robust 
social identity of videogame developers. The notion of representation remains a 
complicated issue for this group of workers and their high-tech peers where a complex 
web of interactions both push towards stronger forms and pull away from apparently 
outmoded options. 
In closing we must acknowledge a limitation of our discussion.  As Haiven 
(2006) notes, an account of a unionization project requires the study of three 
interdependent actors: workers, management and the would-be union. We have briefly 
accounted for the first two, but the blind spot of our work is the unions’ voice.  Given 
the lack of organizing activity in this and other high-tech sectors, further research 
needs to address the degree to which unions need and want to organize the workers.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 References 
 
Acton, Mike (2010, December 25). It doesn’t have to suck #gamedev. [Web log  
comment]. Retrieved from http://insomniacgames.com/blogcast/blog/mike_ 
acton/152561295 . 
Allen, John & Henry, Nick. (1997). Ulrich Beck's risk society at work: Labour and  
employment in the contract service industries. Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers, 22(2), 180-196. 
Amman, John (2002) Unions and the New Economy. Motion Picture and Television  
Unions Offer a Model for New Media Professionals. WorkingUSA, 6(2), 111–
131. 
Batt, Rosemary, Susan Christopherson, Ned Rightor, & Danielle D. van Jaarsveld.  
(2001). Net Working: Work Patterns and Workforce Policies for the New Media 
Industry, Washington, Economic Policy Institute. 
Beck, Ulrich. (1992).  Risk society: Towards a new modernity. New Delhi: Sage. 
Benner, Chris (2003) Computers in the wild: Guilds and next-generation unionism in  
the information revolution.  International Review of Social History, 48, 181-
204. 
Boscia, Ted. (2007, February 27).  http://stnjs.civicactions.net/technology 
Butler, Peter. (2005).Non-union employee representation: Exploring the efficacy of the  
voice process. Employee Relations, 27(3), 272–288. 
Butler, Peter. (2009). Non-union employee representation: Exploring the riddle of  
managerial strategy. Industrial Relations Journal, 40(3), 198-214 
Campbell, Iain. (2002). Snatching at the wind? Unpaid overtime and trade unions in  
Autralia. International Journal of Employment Studies, 10(2), 109-156 
Chasserio, Stéphanie & Marie-Josée Legault. (2009). Strategic human resources  
management is irrelevant when it comes to highly skilled professionals in the 
Canadian new economy! International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 20(5), 1113-1131. 
Code Monkey. (2010, January 27). [Message 149]. Message posted to  
http://www.gamasutra.com/blogs/RockstarSpouse/20100107/4032/Wives_of_ 
Rockstar_San_Diego_employees_have_collected_themselves.php 
Deuze, Mark. (2007). Media Work, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Deuze, Mark, Bowen Martin, Chase & Allen, Christian. (2007). The professional  
identity of gameworkers, Convergence: The International Journal of Research 
into New Media Technologies, 13. 
DePeuter, Greig & Dyer-Witheford, Nick. (2005). A Playful Multitude? Mobilising  
and Counter Mobilising Immaterial Game Labour. FibreCulture Journal, 5.  
Dyer-Witheford, Nick & DePeuter, Greig (2006a). "EA Spouse” and the crisis of video  
game labour: Enjoyment, exclusion, exploitation, exodus. Canadian Journal of 
communication, 31, 599-617. 
Sheffield, Brandon. (2010, October). Top 20 publishers. Game Developer. 
Feldman, Curt & Tor Thorsen (2004, November 11). Employees readying class-action  
lawsuit against EA. Gamespot News. Retrieved from 
http://www.gamespot.com/news/2004/11/11/news_6112998.html 
Findlay, P. (1992). Electronics: A Culture of Participation?  in M. Beirne & H.  
Ramsay (eds), Information Technology and Workplace Democracy, London, 
Routledge, 56–91 
Haiven, Larry (2006). Expanding the Union Zone: Union Renewal through Alternative  
Forms of Worker Organization. Labor Studies Journal, 31(3), 85-116 
Hardt, Michael & Antonio Negri. (2004). Multitude. War and Democracy in The Age  
of Empire, New York, Penguin Books 
Heery, Edmund. (2009). The representation gap and the future of worker  
representation. Industrial Relations Journal, 40(4), 324-336 
Hirschman, Albert Otto (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in  
Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge, Harvard University Press 
Hoffman, Erin. (2004, December 15). LiveJournal, update. [Web log comment].  
Retrieved from http://ea-spouse.livejournal.com/. 
Hyde, Alan. (2000). A closer look at the emerging employment law of Silicon Valley’s  
high-velocity labour market”, in Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl & 
Karl Klare (eds), Labour Law in a Era of Globalisation: Transformative 
Practices and Possibilities, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 233-252 
Hyman, Jeff. (2008, May 13). Quality of life: Does anyone still give a damn?  
Gamasutra. Retreived from http://www.gamasutra.com/view/feature /3656/ 
quality_of_life_does_ anyone_still_.php. 
IGDA (International Game Developers Association). (2011). Kaos Studios and quality  
of life in the game industry. [Web blog comment]. Retrieved from  
http://igdaboard.wordpress.com/2011/01/27/kaos-studios-and-quality-of-life-in-
the-game-industry-2/. 
IGDA (International Game Developers Association). (2004). Quality of Life in the  
Game Industry. Challenges and Best Practices. Retrieved from 
http://www.igda.org/papers-and-reports. 
Kelly, John. (2000). Rethinking Industrial Relations. Mobilization, collectivism and  
long waves, London, Routledge. 
Kline, Stephen, Nick Dyer-Witheford & Greig DePeuter (2003) Digital Play. The  
Interaction of Technology, Culture and Marketing, Montreal, McGill - Queen’s 
Universtity Press 
Lefebvre, Pierre & Phillip Merrigan (2007) Évolution de la situation financière et du  
financement public des industries du film et de la télévision au Québec et des  
cachets des membres de l’Union des artistes (UDA), Research report to l’Union  
des artistes (UDA), unpublished, may 2007 
Legault, Marie-Josée & Guy Bellemare. (2008). Theoretical issues with new actors and  
emergent modes of labour regulation. Relations industrielles –Industrial 
Relations, 63(4), 742-768 
Legault, Marie-Josée & Johanna Weststar. (2010). Is the very notion of  
“representation” relevant for the regulation game of video game developers? 
Paper presented at Challenges of work and workers in a knowledge economy 
conference, Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Canada, October 29-31 
Legault, Marie-Josée & Kathleen Ouellet. (2011). So into it they forget what time it is?  
Video game designers and unpaid overtime. In Dariusz Jemielniak & Abigail 
Marks, Managing Dynamic Technology-Oriented Business: High-Tech 
Organizations and Workplaces, Hershey, IGI Global, coll. Information Science 
Reference, http://igi-
global.com/AuthorsEditors/AuthorEditorResources/CallForBookChapters/Call
ForChapterDetails.aspx?CallForContentId=0d3e732f-c98d-4ddc-8078-
bcd5a3995b13 
Legault, Marie-Josée & Martine D’Amours (201*) Représentation collective et  
citoyenneté au travail chez les travailleurs non-syndiqués qualifiés. Les cas des 
artistes interprètes et des concepteurs de jeux vidéo. Submitted. 
Lloyd, C. (2001). What do employee councils do?  The impact of non-union forms of  
representation on trade union organisation. Industrial Relations Journal, 32, 4, 
313–327. 
Lucio, Miguel Martínez, Steve Walker & Pip Trevorrow. (2009). Making networks  
and (re)making trade union bureaucracy: A European-wide case study of trade 
union engagement with the internet and networking. New Technology, Work 
and Employment, 24(2), 115-130. 
Milton, Laurie P. (2003). An identity perspective on the propensity of high-tech talent  
to unionize. Journal of Labor Research, 24(1), 31-53 
Mosco, Vincent. (2006). Knowledge and media workers in the global economy:  
Antimonies of outsourcing. Social Identities, 12(6), 771-790 
Neff, Gina, Wissinger, Elizabeth, and Zukin, Sharon. (2005). Entrepreneurial labor  
among cultural producers: “Cool” jobs in “hot” industries. Social Semiotics, 15, 
307-334.  
O'Brien, Nina. (2010). Blogging the Writers strike: Identity, interaction, and  
engagement for collective action. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
International Communication Association, Suntec City, Singapore. Retrieved 
from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p404930_index.html 
Remo, Chris. (2008, June 30). Monkey Island’s Gilbert: Industry must unionize to  
move forward. Gamasutra. Retrieved from http://www.gamasutra.com/php-
bin/news_index.php?story=19228. 
Rockstar Spouse (2010, January 7). Wives of Rockstar San Diego employees have  
collected themselves. [Web log comment]. Retrieved from 
http://www.gamasutra.com/blogs/RockstarSpouse/20100107/4032/Wives_of_R
ockstar_San_Diego_employees_have_collected_themselves.php 
Ross, Andrew (2003) No collar. The humane workplace and its hidden costs.  
Philadelphia, Temple University Press 
Ross, Andrew (2009) Nice work if you can get it. Life and Labor in Precarious Times,  
New York, New York University Press 
Shirky, Clay (2008) Here Comes Everybody. The power of organizing without  
organizations, New York, Penguin books 
Schumacher, Leif. (2006). Immaterial Fordism: The paradox of game industry labour.  
Work, Organization, Labour & Globalization, 1(1). 
Taras, Daphne (2001) "Network Building about Work: 'GreedyAssociates.com' and  
Law Firms' Wage Setting.", Paper presented at the CIRA Annual Conference, 
Quebec City, May 2001 
Taras, Daphne G. & Bruce E. Kaufman (2006) ‘Non-union Employee Representation  
in North America: Diversity, Controversy and Uncertain Future’, Industrial 
Relations Journal, 37(5), 513–542 
Upchurch, M., M. Richardson, S. Tailby, A. Danford & P. Stewart (2006) ‘Employee  
Representation in the Non-union Sector: A Paradox of Intention?’, Human 
Resource Management Journal, 16(4), 393–410 
Watling, D. & J. Snook (2001) ‘Works Councils and Trade Unions: Complementary or  
Competitive? The Case of SAGCo’, Paper presented to the BUIRA Conference, 
5–7 July, Manchester Metropolitan University 
Weststar, J. (2010, June). Occupational community as a barrier to traditional forms of  
representation: A study of video game developers. In L. Haiven (Chair), 
Cultural labour and its collective interest representation. Symposium paper 
presented at the Canadian Industrial Relations Association Annual Meeting 
(CIRA), Université Laval, Québec City, QC. 
Witz, Anne. (1990). Patriarchy and professions: The gendered politics of occupational  
closure. Sociology, 24(4), 675-690.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
